# Rambling brain-dump

- What is the resolution to the impossibility of heat death, since that implies
- 0 entropy? (probably just a confusion of terms)
- either
- physics is not time-reversible, or
- something would come from nothing when running from heat death in reverse.

- Some physicist (Phil Torres) referenced in Wikipedia made the claim that if we start running simulations of our own (people-type-simulations), then odds are we're at the bottom of a very large stack of simulations on simulations by entities higher up the chain. He argues that this poses an existential risk, since if any one of them above us gets shut down, we go with it. I suspect if that arrangement were the case, it would probably be an infinite number above us, and since we haven't been shut down, it would be impossible for that to happen, and since that is unlikely, we are probably not in a simulation that is capable of external termination.
- An unpleasant counter-possibility to this is that many (most?) of identical simulations in parallel are indeed shut down due to whatever external agency, but the anthropic principle dictates that we cannot be aware of that.

- I take as my only axiom in cosmology that something cannot come from nothing. Therefore, there was "never" nothing. Rigel argues this is meaningless; although we agreed that there either could have been something (as is the case), or nothing, discussing the nature of "nothing" is at best meaningless, at worst impossible. Also, I argue that since there is something, and given that something can neither arise from or decay to nothing, there has "always" been something and will "always" be something.
- Let us assume a quantized universe.
- Given my arguments on by.tc, finite bound on space implies finite time, since there are at most %2^n% informationally unique and discernable states the a bounded quantized space can represent. What makes a "different" loop different in any way if we're lacking any sort of external referent?
- This fits well with the equivalency of space and time.
- For the same reason, infinite space implies (the potential for) infinite time--I believe this holds even if there is only a finite amount of matter/energy/information occupying it.
- The Big Bang could not be the beginning of time (especially true if time and space are as interchangeable as Rigel suggests.). If it were, then even if it were spatially infinite, there would be a fi… something!
- Distracted by the thought that this implies that the age of the observable universe is only the age in our light cone, and that in all likelihood, it is a continuous event that has been ongoing always and will continue forever, and not at all uniform over its presumed infinite space.

- Given my arguments on by.tc, finite bound on space implies finite time, since there are at most %2^n% informationally unique and discernable states the a bounded quantized space can represent. What makes a "different" loop different in any way if we're lacking any sort of external referent?
- The relatively few number of rules that govern the operation of the universe:
- I believe the probability of our simulation by a sentient species or equivalent is negligible due to, among other things, the argument above pointing out that we're still around.
- But furthermore, a non-biased computationally-distributed multiverse would favor simplicity. See research on by.tc into extremely low rate of complexity arising in random data.
- The Anthropic Principle is true inasmuch as we are here, thus we must be in a universe that supports 'intelligence'. Paired with the above, a computational universe approach would suggest that we occupy virtually as simple a universe as possible that is still compatible with the formation of beings of our observational reference class.
- This also explains the finely-tuned cosmological constants. Bottom line: take the information content inherent in those constants combined with a plausible estimate for equations or algorithms governing our physical law, and I suspect you will find something on the order of, I don't know, a kilobyte, give or take a few orders of magnitude. This fits perfectly with a computation-derived multiverse.

- Why I think the bottom layer of reality is going to be essentially identical to a bit, even if it is a particle of some kind:
- Finite numbers are unnatural. The universe sticks to 1, 0 and %\infty%, and of those three, %\infty% is essentially just a derived identity. The probability of anything in the universe having a quantity other than one of those is vanishingly small.